

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 DAR ES 03290 01 OF 02 151321Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----038779 151330Z /50  
O 151124Z AUG 77 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5906

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 3290

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS LONDON, LUSAKA, PRETORIA, USUN IF DESIRED

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: RH, TZ  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT NYERERE ON RHODESIAN PROBLEM

RF: A) STATE 192562, B) STATE 192569

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT NYERERE MORNING AUGUST 15 RECEIVED PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER (REF A) VERY WARMLY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT GUT ISSUE WAS WHAT WILL BE DONE NOT ONLY ABOUT SMITH BUT ABOUT SMITH'S ARMY. HE AGREES UNCONDITIONALLY WITH STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE ON THIS SUBJECT CONTAINED PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER, BUT ON BASIS HIS CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN ON AUGUST 13 HE DOUBTS THAT OWEN ACCEPTS PRINCIPLE OR HAS ANY IDEA HOW TO IMPLEMENT IT. THEREFORE, HE DOES NOT FEEL HE CAN CALL HIS FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES TOGETHER UNTIL THERE IS CLARIFICATION FROM THE BRITISH ON EXACTLY WHAT THEY INTEND TO DO WITH SMITH'S ARMY. THIS CLARIFICATION COULD BEST COME TO HIM DIRECTLY FROM THE BRITISH BUT HE WOULD ACCEPT IT FROM US. MEANWHILE, HE WILL HAVE HIS FOREIGN MINISTER BEGIN PREPARING FOR A MEETING OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. NYERERE REITERATED HIS PROMISE TO PRESIDENT CARTER TO CALL THE MEETING TO HEAR OWEN AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG AS SOON AS CLARIFICATION IS OBTAINED, BUT FEELS TIMING WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE AFTER RATHER THAN BEFORE THE LAGOS  
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 DAR ES 03290 01 OF 02 151321Z

CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.

2. I DELIVERED PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER (REF A) TO PRESIDENT NYERERE MORNING AUGUST 15 IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY RETURN TO DAR ES SALAAM. NYERERE SAID THE LETTER WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WANTED. IT CONFIRMED THAT HE AND PRESIDENT CARTER IN WASHINGTON AND HE AND SECRETARY VANCE IN LONDON HAD UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER PERFECTLY.

SPECIFICALLY, NYERERE AGREED THAT THE PRESENCE IN RHODESIA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD OF ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS FROM THE PREVIOUS RHODESIAN FORCES WAS AGREEABLE TO HIM (TOGETHER, OF COURSE, WITH UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCES, AND LIBERATION FORCES WHICH WILL BE BASE OF ARMY OF INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE.)

3. HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALK WITH OWEN IN LONDON AUGUST 13, NYERERE DOUBTED THAT THE BRITISH HAD YET ACCEPTED PRESIDENT CARTER'S PRINCIPLES OR HAD ANY IDEA HOW TO IMPLEMENT THEM. FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S AND SECRETARY VANCE'S INFORMATION ONLY, HE CAME AWAY WITH THE FEELING THAT OWEN WOULD ACTUALLY LIKE TO PRESENT A HALF-BAKED PLAN WHICH THE AFRICANS WOULD HAVE TO REJECT. WHEN NYERERE REPEATED TO OWEN HIS UNDERSTANDINGS WITH SECRETARY VANCE, INCLUDING IDEA THAT NUMBER OF FORMER RHODESIAN FORCES TO BE MAINTAINED WAS CRITICAL, OWEN SAID SECRETARY VANCE MUST NOT HAVE UNDERSTOOD PLAN. OWEN SAID THEY WOULD GET RID OF SELOUS SCOUTS IMMEDIATELY BUT THAT WAS ALL HE HAD TO SAY. NYERERE NEEDS TO KNOW THAT UK IS GOING TO DO MUCH MORE THAN THAT. ALL OWEN WOULD SAY WAS UK NEEDED TIME TO WORK THINGS OUT. UK SSPTOAPGLTPT SEEMED TO SHARE US URENCY BUT AT SAME TIME KEPT TALKING ABOUT NEEDING TIME. TO NYERERE, OWEN HAD JUST NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH FOR NYERERE TO BE ABLE TO TRUST HIM AND CALL MEETING. THE JOB NOW, NYERERE SAID, IS TO GET UK TO BE AS SPECIFIC AS PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER ON THE FORCES QUESTION AND TO GET IT TO DO SOMETHING TO INSPIRE MORE CONFIDENCE THAN OWEN HAD INSPIRED LAST SATURDAY IN LONDON.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 DAR ES 03290 01 OF 02 151321Z

4. LET US ASSUME SOME ELEMENTS OF SMITH ARMY WILL BE INCORPORATED, NYERERE PROPOSED. THE UK ALONE CANNOT DETERMINE WHICH AND HOW MANY. IT MUST AGREE WITH THE LIBERATION AND UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCE COMMANDER. ALL THREE FORCES WILL BE THERE ON T-1 (TRANSITION DAY ONE), BUT WHAT IS THE MECHANISM FOR T-2, ETC. THE "FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS" MUST BE TO GET THE NEGATIVE ELEMENTS OF SMITH'S ARMY (AND NOT JUST THE SELOUS SCOUTS) OUT OF THE WAY. NYERERE DOESN'T HAVE TO KNOW ALL THE DETAILS. HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES MUST, HOWEVER, HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE UK DOES NOT INTEND FOR SMITH'S ARMY TO LAST THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD BECAUSE, IF IT DOES, INDEPENDENCE -- EVEN WITHOUT SMITH -- WILL NOT BE REAL. HE THINKS OWEN SEES THE SMITH ARMY AS PERSISTING THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD. "WHEN THE BRITISH DITHER, I AM SUSPICIOUS. OWEN DITHERED."

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 DAR ES 03290 02 OF 02 151323Z  
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O 151124Z AUG 77  
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5907

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 3290

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS LONDON, LUSAKA, PRETORIA, USUN IF DESIRED

5. THROUGHOUT HOUR OF INTENSE CONVERSATION, NYERERE EMPHASIZED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF AND GRATITUDE FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S BONAFIDES. HE OVERRODE FOREIGN MINISTER MKAPA'S MILD QUERY ON MEANING OF PHRASE IN PRESIDENT'S LETTER THAT ARMY OF INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE WAS TO BE ONE OF ZIMBABWE'S OWN CHOOSING. (MKAPA WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER WE WERE POSSIBLY PREEMPTING THAT CHOICE BY REST OF FORMULATION.) NYERERE SAID THIS WAS NOT CASE. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SAID IT RIGHT AND HE AGREED WITH IT.

6. IF PRESIDENT CARTER CAN GET A MESSAGE BACK TO HIM THAT THE BRITISH DO INDEED INTEND TO DISMANTLE SMITH'S ARMY SO THAT IT PROMPTLY LOSES THE POWER TO CONTROL EVENTS AND THAT THE BRITISH REALLY KNOW HOW TO DO THIS, NYERERE WILL CALL HIS COLLEAGUES TOGETHER IMMEDIATELY. IN SOME WAYS, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE BETTER IF UK GAVE HIM THE NEEDED CLARIFICATION DIRECTLY. AND NYERERE'S GUESS IS THAT THE US WILL HAVE TO DO SOME ARM-TWISTING TO GET LONDON TO DO THAT.

7. AS TO THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS' MEETING, NYERERE PROMISED PRESIDENT CARTER HE WOULD CONVENE IT TO HEAR SECRETARY OWEN AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG, AND HE WILL DO SO AS SOON AS HE GETS THE NEEDED CLARIFICATION OF THE BRITISH POSITION. HE WOULD DO IT AT ONCE BUT HE THINKS AFTER RATHER THAN BEFORE THE LAGOS CONFERENCE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DAR ES 03290 02 OF 02 151323Z

IS PREFERABLE. MEANWHILE, FOREIGN MINISTER MKAPA WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES AND BEGIN PREPARATIONS. MKAPA IS TO TELL OTHERS OF NYERERE'S INTENTION AND TO SAY HE IS AWAITING CLARIFICATION ON A FEW POINTS.

8. COMMENT: ON WHAT SEEM TO BE TWO KEY POINTS:

(A) NYERERE UNEQUIVOCALLY ACCEPTED THE FORMULATION ON FORCES IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER. I BELIEVE HE WILL STICK TO IT. IF FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN BELIEVES NYERERE REVERSED HIS POSITION WITH HIM, IT MAY WELL BE BECAUSE NYERERE FEELS OWEN DID NOT LIVE UP WITH NYERERE TO THE WASHINGTON AGREEMENTS. (WE BOTH NOTED AT THIS POINT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SAID NOT EVERYTHING HE AND NYERERE HAD AGREED TO WAS NECESSARILY AGREED TO BY THE BRITISH.)

(B) ON THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS' MEETING, I PUSHED NYERERE AS HARD AS I COULD FOR A MEETING THIS WEEK. HE DID NOT RESENT MY EFFORTS AND DID NOT ABSOLUTELY FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS SURE PRESIDENT CARTER WANTED THE THING THEY HAD AGREED TO DONE RIGHT AND, AS OF THE MOMENT, HE DID NOT BELIEVE OWEN WAS PREPARED TO DO IT RIGHT. HE INDICATED HE COULD ALSO BENEFIT FROM A LITTLE MORE TIME TO GET HIS FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES "READY" AND THAT HE WOULD CLEARLY FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE WITH A MEETING AFTER THE LAGOS CONFERENCE.

WHAT MORE CAN AND SHOULD BE GOTTEN FROM THE BRITISH -- AND HOW -- IS OBVIOUSLY SOMETHING ONLY WASHINGTON CAN DECIDE. NYERERE IS CAPABLE OF SLICING THE SALAMI PRETTY FINE, BUT I BELIEVE HE IS SINCERE AND THAT, IF SOMETHING CAN BE DONE TO RESTORE HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE BRITISH, HE WILL LIVE UP TO HIS PROMISES. NYERERE SAID HE WOULD LET ME KNOW WHAT HE HEARD FROM THE BRITISH AND WOULD APPRECIATE OUR LETTING HIM KNOW WHAT WE HEAR.

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PAGE 03 DAR ES 03290 02 OF 02 151323Z

10. SHOULD TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS PROVE INADEQUATE TO HANDLE THIS MATTER, IT MIGHT BE WORTH CONSIDERING HAVING AMBASSADOR YOUNG ALONE (I.E., NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY UK REPRESENTATIVE) COME HERE (PERHAPS STOPPING IN LONDON EN ROUTE) BEFORE HE GOES TO LAGOS, WITH THE AIM OF SETTING UP AN OWEN-YOUNG MEETING WITH THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AFTER LAGOS.  
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## Message Attributes

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